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Duncan M. The father of medicine (1876) 22(6): 482-499.


==The father of medicine==
By J. MATTHEWS DUNCAN, M.D., LLD.
* The opening Address of the 139th Session, 1876-77, of the Royal Medical
Society, delivered 10th November.
Among the greatest men of all times appears the majestic figure of
Hippocrates, called the Father of Medicine, Who should, in all his
main features at least, be familiar to students of the Healing Art.
There existed not one only, but a line of physicians bearing this
name, in which the second is held to be the chief, and to be referred
to when another is not specially designated. The works of Hippocrates consist of a considerable collection of articles or pamphlets
on the history, philosophy, and ethics of medicine, on the causes,
prognostics, and treatment of disease, and on special diseases and
accidents. In this discourse reference is made exclusively to his
medical writings. He was a surgeon as Well as a physician; but
his position and merits as a surgeon, great though they are, do not come within the scope of the present discussion.
The ingenuity of the learned has been extensively and laboriously exerted to decide which among the heap of Hippocratic treatises are the genuine works of Hippocrates the Second, which are not.
The questions raised in their erudite Writings, while they are of
secondary importance, and will probably never be conclusively
settled, do not come within the reach of the present discourse. In
accordance with common practice, Hippocrates and the Hippocratic
writings may be treated as a unity, Whose further decomposition
can produce no important result beyond the satisfaction of a 1a1idable literary curiosity. The grandeur, the beauty, the value of the
Homeric poems will be little modified should it come to be decided
that they are the Work of several men at different times, not of one
man, as is popularly believed; and so it is with the import and
value of the Works of the Father of Medicine.
The-purpose of this discourse is to justify the reverence and
honour given to Hippocrates, and, if possible, to deter the ignorant
and the pedantic from calling upon his name in vain. To prove
the present desirability of these objects by special examples would be both painful and invidious ; we require only to refer in a
general way to modern medical literature. No name is more frequently cited than that of Hippocrates, yet almost never with a
just or full appreciation of this merits, while his authority is on
innumerable occasions called in to support views with which he
had nothing in common. The most recent and advanced discoveries are recognised in an author who lived more than two
thousand years ago, and who was ignorant of the elements of the
subject. This process is not of recent growth, for the discoveries
even of Harvey were, soon after being published, found to be
anticipated by Hippocrates.
In my own day, his writings have been referred to by eminent
men as authoritative for us in regard to pleurisy, to Bright’s
disease, and to heart disease, and many others. If the old gentleman were alive, he might with complacence and pride receive
the homage due to his great merits, and especially to his, the
earliest, attempts to discriminate and describe diseases. He might
admit that he occasionally succeeded in drawing faint and inaccurate outlines of some maladies, scarcely to be recognised and
identified by us now; but he would spurn the foolish flatterers
who ascribe to him knowledge which was not dreamt of till two
thousand years after his time. The ordinary practitioner of our day knows almost infinitely more of disease than did the great
Father of Medicine. It would be as easy to find the latest discoveries of astronomy and of chemistry 1 in the works of the astrologers and alchemists, as to find recent medicine anticipated
in the Hippocratic writings.
In the history of Medicine there are only two great cpochs—that
of Hippocrates, about 400 B.C.; and that of the fifteenth century.
The former was that of the birth of medicine, and the father was
Hippocrates. The latter was the foundation of medical science by
the anatomists and physiologists, of whom Vesalius and Harvey
are generally made the representatives. The former was one of
the many glorious products of Greece. The latter was one of the
many glorious products of Northern Italy. At present we cannot
foresee even the probability of the advent of another era so great in
medicine as these, but may reasonably anticipate a series of
periods marked by brilliant discoveries, such as have already been
continuously produced since the revival of learning, or by wide generalizations for which the way would seem to be already prepared.
I It is the custom of historians to describe the curative proceedings of the priests in their temples as the first stage or epoch in the progress of medicine, as distinguished from surgery; but it is much
more correct to say that it began with Hippocrates. There was, in
truth, no medicine before him, but only a seeking from the gods
by prayers, or by incantations and charms, such aid as resulted in
cures properly so called. There was no substantial approach to
knowledge of the human frame and constitution, and there had
been no methodical observation of disease; there could be nothing worthy of the name of medicine. These aiite—Hippocratic days
were the era of cure, not of treatment; or of cure as distinguished
from treatment: and one of Hippocrates’s chief claims to our
honour is that he despised and rejected the whole affair. His
chapter on the morbus sacer, considering the time when, and the
circumstances under which, it was written,‘ is an imperishable
monument to his glory, a proof of his courage and his wisdom.
Its teaching is nearly as much needed now as ever it was ; for, considering our time and circumstances, we have, in the specifics and many other cures of. our day, grosser superstition than Hippocrates had to encounter. Cures occur only in the hands of the
ignorant and superstitious; and the light of science should, ere
this, have rendered them ridiculous. But it is not so. One of
the most renowned physicians of modern times deliberately
recommends a metallic salt for headache, as he had seen it cure a
case! another most eminent and respected physician recommends
a peculiar saline as a cure of a rare and ill-understood kidney
disease, for he had tried it in one case!
The cures in the temples of ./Esculapius are said to have been
resuscitated in another form soon after Hippocrates showed their
utter vanity. But they have been, indeed, never extinct. They
flourished vigorously in the middle ’ages, under the priestly garb
of the Christianity of the time, and they still survive in various
quarters. They flourished notoriously even in the time of Harvey,
for then (and long after) the king touched for the “evil.” They
are almost daily produced now by our most renowned physicians,
as I have just exemplified, and- as I could further abundantly
prove, did I not prefer to avoid exciting the nausea of all scientific
men. The whole homoeopathic system, so far as it is peculiar, is
composed of this nonsense, and of this alone.
Hippocrates was the Father of Medicine—not any priest, or
priestly system. There were, no doubt, before Hippocrates, much valuable medical skill, and many useful appliances; but these do
not constitute medicine as he established it, and as we teach it.
These were an humble but valuable class of proceedings, ‘as much
used now as ever they were; but, even as accumulated in our day,
not constituting, indeed contributing very little towards constituting, a system of medicine. Were it just to go back to the priests
of Esculapius as forming a step in the progress of medicine, I
should not allow the retrospective historical scrutiny to stop there ;
for I would, with equal justice, invoke the principles of Darwin,
and date the beginning of medicine further back than the
historical period. It may be held as certain that before the inedicine to be found in the history of the creation of man, there was
the medicine of the brutes; and the simple faith and uncomplicated proceeding of the dog who seeks his _cure by an emetic,
chosen among the herbs of the field, is more to be admired and
respected than the falsities of a credulous priesthood; or, in legitimate succession, the mystery of the aqua epidemica, or the
Mithridate, or the Venice treacle, as used by the so-called Father
of English Medicine, or the specifics of this day.
The first epoch of medicine was an era of medical knowledge, as
distinguished from medical science. Till the structure of the healthy
human frame was revealed by the labours of the anatomists, there
could be no science of medicine properly so called. Anatomy is itself, in this sense, not a science, unless, indeed, that name is attached to mere observations. Observation is the essential foundation of
science, and in the works of Hippocrates there is a marvellous
accumulation of it; just as there is in the medical writings of our
own day. But, in our day, anatomy and physiology have come to
form the foundations of Medical Science, which can scarcely be
said to have existed before decided progress was made in them.
To exclude mere observations from science is not to throw discredit on them. A good observer is a man endowed with a rare
faculty, which may amount to genius; as is attested by many of
the works of our justly renowned mere naturalists or mere
anatomists. Hippocrates was a great observer, as his works
abundantly testify. At his time, observations were the first and
great desideratum, as is the _oase still; but in his day there was
room for little elsethan this accumulation of materials; and this
cannot now be said of large departments of medicine.
Although in the early periods of medicine the cultivation of
observation was, as Hippocrates carefully stated, the great, almost
the only, requirement, it was impossible to repress theorizing; and
of this Hippocrates himself furnishes many remarkable examples.
But the tendency could not then, and cannot now, be kept within
due bounds. The true mode of progress, by observation, came to
be neglected; and the field of medicine was divided between the
dogmatists and the empirics. We should nowadays call them the philosophizers and the mere practitioners. Of. course there are  considerable differences between the dogmatists of ancient times
and the philosophizers of our day, arising from the great increase
of medical knowledge and advance of medical science; and, for
the same reason, there is much difference between the empirics
and our mere practitioners. But, in scientific method, or rather
in despite of scientific method, the two modern classes are
identical with the two old divisions. The dogmatists trust too
much to mere reason, struggle too ardently to anticipate the solid
progress of science, conduct their inductions "on too narrow a basis,
reason from general principles which have themselves insufficient
foundation. The empirics have a blind and unreasoning confidence
in what they call experience; and, neglectful of the errors of their
predecessors, allow themselves to be guided by mere appearances.
In our day, neither of these classes avows a disregard for science,
but they really have it, if they are to be judged by their works,
not by their professions.
This digression will facilitate the estimate of Hippocrates which we propose to sketch. He was neither a mere dogmatist, nor a
mere empiric ; and, if he had lived in our day, would not be
classed among the philosophizers or mere practitioners, but he would have taken his place among the limited class of scientific
practitioners, or those who cherish science as the only substantial
basis of practice (but who, nevertheless, allow themselves an extravagant amount of pseudo-philosophic and empirical digressions).
The historians of medicine, in pursuing their tedious and almost
profitless task, describe system after system, that of Hippocrates
being nearly the earliest; a historical mimicking of the progress of
science, which seems delightful to them, but it is the mistake of
the bobbing about of a bear for real dancing. There is no science
in the philosophic basis of the system of Hippocrates; in his four
humours, his coction, and crasis. It is a philosophic toy which he
invented, or a hypothesis which he introduced. In all times these
hypotheses have been supplied, as they are still; and they are, no
doubt, necessary to satisfy the philosophic cravings of mankind.
They represent stages in the historical, not the real progress of
medicine. They are partially embodied in such terms as “Nature,”
“ Vis medicatrix naturae,” “ Archwus,” “ Anima,” “Vita principle.” They embrace too little of that physical and chemical
knowledge, which, combined with due observation, dconsfitutelsl.
the whole of medical science. So far as they pro uce suc
hypotheses, Hippocrates, Galen, Van Helrnont, Stahl, Hoffmann, fioerhaave, and Cullen, are mere pliilosophic _triflers_; prematurely,
but yet as impelled by necessity mimicking scientific theory,
and guiding generations of medical men by ignes fatmj. They are
the jigging bears, and all the doctors jig after them, and noisily
rejoice and believe they are gracefully dancing to the music of the
s heres.
There are only two classes of great medical men and medical
writings, the scientific and the non-scientific ; and these last are subdivided into the dogmatists or philosophizers, and the empirics or
mere practitioners. The dogmatists caricature true philosophy, the
empirics genuine experience.  it 1S not to be supposed that every
individual physician or every individual work can be_ ranged under
these categories. Even the greatest men are very imperfect, and
almost necessarily commingle in their productions the fancy of the
philosophizer, the rashness of the empiric, and the caution of the
scientific man. Philosophizing . and empiricism are probably
necessary evils, and may even in some obscure way contribute to
real rooress.
As there really was no medical science, and as it was scarcely
possible there should be any, before Harvey, so none 1S to be
looked for in the writings of Hippocrates. What then of everlasting work did all the great medical men before Harvey do, and
what are most great medical men now doing? In addition to being, in some degree, philosophizers and empirics, they have been
and are, by diligent observation and research, accumulating the
materials necessary for the construction of science. This is the
evidently necessary and everlasting Work which they are doing,
and in this work Hippocrates was the leader, and a great deal
more.
Probably no man has ever done more or more difficult Work, in
theway of observation and research, than the great Hippocrates.
Considering that before his day the ignorance of diseases, their
classification, causes, symptoms, prognosis, and treatment, were as
a tabula msa, We cannot sufiiciently admire and Wonder at his
genius, his labours, his success. He truly begat medical knowledge and medical Work ;—a good parent, to be admired, respected,
imitated, by his loving children of all time: , Had he done nothing
else than this work, he would have been the greatest figure among
the heroes of Medicine.
The individual feats in observation and research achieved by
Jenner, by Laennec, by Bright, not to speak of some in our own time, were as grand as, and probably more difficult than, any done by Hippocrates; but they are small when compared with his in
extent and in epoch.
But it is time now to state categorically what are the great
things which Hippocrates did, and which entitle him to the
undying fame which is his.
First of all, he was, I repeat, the Father of Medicine, and in this
respect he must ever stand alone. Before his day, Medicine was a
department of the duties of priests. The sick came to the temples
to be healed, and no doubt they often were healed by the holy men,
who could not fail to gather from the rawest experience some
practical knowledge and skill, and to acquire confidence in their
nostrums, whether they were useful, or ridiculous and useless. It
is to be supposed that in those days, as in ours, priests were not disposed to part with their privileges; and the task of Hippocrates, in taking from them this great department of their labours and of
their sources of emolument, must have been a very difiicult one.
The difficulty was, no doubt, enhanced by the fact that this great man, as one of themselves, born and bred in the cloth, would be naturally looked to as a friend and supporter. But for this work,
his force of character was sufficiently great, and We may guess from
his strong expressions regarding the divinities of disease and cure,
that he had much opposition to encounter in his efforts to place
the practice of medicine on a new and better footing than it held
among the priests. He Was, indeed, as we may judge from what
he says, quite as clear from superstition and priestly influence as
those supposed to be the most heterodox in our own day. He
anticipated Lord Palmerston many ages, and would certainly have
applauded that statesman’s advice (to look to the drains), given
to a clergy and people who were clamorous for prayers against
the approaching scourge of cholera. There is one department of medicine which was greatly studied by Hippocrates, namely,
prognostics; and it is justly surmised that he may have derived
much assistance here from the learning of the temples; for we
know how ardently the priests strove to satisfy the cravings of all
their devotees to peer into the future—a laudable craving, and one
from the indulgence of which some of the skill may have been
acquired which we find in many of his sagacious aphorisms.
But it was not the priests alone that Hippocrates had to
encounter in carrying out his great work of establishing the
separate individuality of his great child. Medicine was, if not a
department of philosophy, at least a frequent topic for philosophic
dialectics. Many of the great philosophers of his time dabbled in
it; and he, no doubt, saw that they made a horrid mess of the
matter; just as they continue to do to this day, whether the
philosophers are regulars and profess in academic chairs, or
the irregulars of lofty philosophical ambition. As he took the
practice from the priests, so he took the theory from the philosophers; and it is devoutly to be wished that some of his followers would do a like service in our day—a more subtle and difficult work, but one of the same kind. N o doubt Hippocrates himself
went too far in the mere philosophic direction, in founding his
system. But, as we have already said, no man is perfect; and
there could be suggested ‘many palliations of the proceeding of
Hippocrates in substituting for older hypotheses that of the
humours and their elaboration. We must be thankful to him for
what he did, confessing that he at the same time made many,
because nearly inevitable, errors.
It is difficult and vain to arrange in order of merit the various
great achievements of Hippocrates, yet that which most clearly
demonstrates his intellectual depth is the method of advancing
medicine which he inculcated—the method of observation. .He
expelled philosophy and philosophers from medicine, and would not
in his own day, nor in ours, be called a philosopher; yet he was
the only genuine and true philosopher of them all. He brought
medicine down from heaven to earth, and insisted on the prime
necessity, truly the necessity of his day, to observe,.to observe, to
observe. That observation, which is the basis of science, the first step in the philosophy of medicine, he not only inculcated, but also liberally exemplified. Till long after his day, there could be no other philosophy for medicine; but his preaching was soon for
gotten, and his ardent, but too little instructed immediate , successors, soon came to neglect the accumulation of observations, and
ran riot in dogmatic and empirical philosophizing, just as his
latest successors still do.
It would be easy to point out striking evidences of his powers
of observation, but it is a work of supererogation. The literature
of the healing art was enriched by his cases, detailed accounts of single instances regarded as worthy of particular attention. Many medical writers, even of our own day, have despised the laborious
taking of cases; and they are foolish in thus rejecting the example
of this great master. But the merit of Hippocrates, which we now
insist upon, is not in his observations themselves, but in his
recognition of the value of observation. We have already alluded
to the common error of trying to find actual instruction in his
observations, and laying in this the chief claim of Hippocrates to
be studied nowadays. This is a great mistake. His observations
are no doubt admirable, and would be more so, if we could, in
regard to many important words, be sure of his meaning; but it is
his method of advancing medicine by observation that forms his
chief glory.
Some of his observations are very erroneous; many are very
true, and have passed into common use and remain, as the facies
Hippocmtica. On" one of his observations—the so-called Hippocratic succussion—I shall say a few words, because it has been
often described as an indication of his genius; and it really was
so, but not in the sense understood by most of his admirers. It
was, in itself, a crude, and for us a worthless, observation; but
it indicated a high kind of intellectual forethought amounting
to genius. It showed that he strained after the true ‘method of
investigating diseases of the chest, when fluids were accumulated
in it, that he was ready to test the value of all kinds of observation.
Hippocrates is generally said to have used succussion to distinguish
empyema from hydrothorax; but this is not well settled, for he
certainly speaks of the use of succussion in the latter. Unfortunately, there is no sign derivable from succussion either in empyema
or hydrothorax; and it is difficult to understand how Hippocrates
should have expected it. It is, of course, only when these diseases
are complicated with pneumothorax, that there can be use of
succussion ; but the error is perhaps palliated by our finding that, so
lately as the time of the “ First Lines of the Practice of Physic,” the
great Cullen made the same egregious mistake. Some attempts
have been made at explaining the error, by supposing that an
empyema was mistaken for a large vomica containing pus and air.
But the fact’ is that nothing, in this point of view, can come of
this investigation, nothing instructive to us as practitioners. Yet
the investigation reveals to us the genius of Hippocrates, who, by
his false or erroneous observations, anticipated, though in a very
limited sense, the grand discoveries of Avenbrugger and Laennec.
It has been repeatedly said that Hippocrates anticipated Bacon; that his philosophy is really according to the inductive method;
and while this is partially true, it is mainly a great exaggeration.
All men who make elementary progress in science must follow
this inductive method; they must accumulate facts by exercise of
the faculty of observation. Had Hippocrates not done this, we
should neverhave heard of him as the Father of Medicine. He did
this systematically, and it is his chief title to immortality. The accumulation of pertinent facts, however, is not the inductive method of Bacon, still less is it the inductive method as further
expounded by recent philosophers. Hippocrates did nothing more as a distinct contribution to method. Yet, though he did not
inculcate the next step in induction, the framing of hypotheses, he
fully exemplified it. But the exemplification of a method does
not indicate knowledge of it. A man may reason very well
without knowing logic. So Hippocrates made the second step
in induction, without knowing he was doing so; he framed
hypotheses. He framed them very badly; or, he committed the
commonest error, and perhaps an inevitable one, of scientific
explorers, he framed hypotheses, the chief of which constitute his
system, and regarded them as valid theories, while they were only
too eager and erroneous anticipations. How much too eager and
ambitious may be conceived, when we consider that his system
has fallen, has been succeeded by many others, all of which have also fallen; and that the wise medical men of the present day,
while they smile at such ruins, even those of our own Cullen,
attempt to rear no portentous edifices, but satisfy themselves with
humbler, more solid, and more contracted structures.
But facts and hypotheses are only steps in an induction, and
we find no indication in Hippocrates that he knew how to test a
hypothesis, by trying how it can be Worked from deductively, or
how to make it secure by various methods of what is called
verification. We may almost ven'ture to say that the true
inductive method was scarcely desiderated in the days of Hippocrates. Medical knowledge was not ripe for it, as it is now.
Enough that the great Father of Medicine set it on its right
course for becoming a science; a position which we can say it
has reached, though not even now in the grand comprehensive
generalizations which he and many of his followers vainly thought
they had - achieved, but which the best moderns only recognise as
objects to be aimed at.
Hippocrates, like other philosophers, scems to have known the
untenable character and practically misleading quality of some
hypotheses of his predecessors; but not of his own. Yet his great
hypothesis or system was as weak as any other: He went as far In
the true way of advancing medicine as, at ll1S time, he could, when
he insisted on observation. He did not foresee the use of numbers
as Louis used them; and, had Bacon lived in his time, he could
not have systematized the inductive philosophyyfor science had
made too little progress to furnish a suflicient field of observations
on method, from which to draw the generalization implied in that
which is called Baconian. But, after all, philosophic methods are
more interesting, as themselves forming a department of science,
than as teaching scientific men how to succeed in their pursuits.
We now pass to an entirely different matter, namely, the
Hippocratic practice; an extremely interesting subject, but in all respects less important for us than what may be called the
Hippocratic philosophy. As in the philosophy we distinguished
the method from the result; observation from its fruits; so in the
practice We have to distinguish the principles from the details.
Just as it is extensively and erroneously held that the specific
observations of Hippocrates are more important for us than his
plan or method ; so it is extensively and erroneously held that the
chief interest of his practice lies in the details, not in the underlying principles.
The details of his medical practice I shall say almost nothing about. For the poor suffering patient they are of supreme im
portance. Nothing else, indeed, is of importance at all. But who
can give any rational account of them as practised by Hippocrates,
or as practised now; except so far as they are easily proved by
lay, as distinguished from instructed experience? That there is
daily given out by professional men, as there was by Hippocrates,
a mass of valuable advice, I have no doubt; but it is lamentably
unscientific, and therefore here undescribable. Two points in the
practice of this ancient are worthy of special notice and admiration. First, in accordance with his peculiar prognostios, which
included the causation of disease, he attached great importance to
diet and regimen, including residence and climate; and much
advice, still considered valuable, is to be found in the records of
this department of his practice. Second, his prescriptions were
simple, compounded nearly exclusively from the plants of Greece.
We have no trace of the ridiculous confections which were introduced in later times, and which Sydenham used, such as the
Mithridate of the London Pharmacopoeia, with its fifty ingredients.
The superstitious belief in imaginary remedies, so prevalent in our
day and in the time of Hippocrates, is not less useful nor less
injurious than that of Sydenham ; but it is greatly less absurd.
In his history of medicine, Dunglison says that superstition is
now restricted to the vulgar. There never was a greater mistake.
Among the highest and most learned in our profession, and out of
it, superstition, or belief in idle and unproved things, is as rife as
ever it was. Regarding what remedy in common use can a
physician give a reason, suflicient for all, for the faith that is in
him? He knows many juvantia and laedentia in different cases,
with some degree of assurance, but tangible remedies are the
favourites of the physician and of the vulgar. They are for the most part now, as heretofore, mere ‘matters of fashion. On the principle of doing his best, the physician may be bound to use
them, but it IS almost" a humiliating proceeding at this time of
day. “Ubi physicus des1nit,” says Stahl, “medicus incipit.”  There is no exercise of faith in medical science; but without it medical practice is hardly to be imagined. What a tissue of
superstition is embodied in our dispensatories! We have not
now, neither had Hippocrates, such a complication of solemn nonsense as the “sovereign syrup for melancholy,” the “theriaca
Andromachi,” or the “Mithridate,” all of the London Phar1nacopoeia, and some of them in use within the memory of people
still living; but we have in active use, if not in our Pharmacopoeias, little else than such solemn nonsense in a less complicated form. What is the value of our beloved “bromide,” at
present used for all diseases? What the value of the rest?
Alas! we can only say with Hippocrates, that We do what we can.
The details of Hippocrates’s practice are just as valuable or valueless as those of our own, and I may give one example. He lays it down as a rule that bleeding causes abortion, and must therefore
be avoided in the treatment of pregnant women. Some centuries
later, Celsus discovered that it was possible to bleed a pregnant
woman without causing abortion. Then bleeding became a
panacea for the diseases of pregnancy, and especially valued for
the prevention of abortion. It was not a remedy of common
potency, it was specific; and Robert Boyle, in his work on specific
medicines, points out “hoW prejudicial it may be to many patients
that physicians be prepossessed with a bad opinion of a useful
remedy, may be guessed by him that shall consider what multitudes of teeming women that probably might have been saved by
the skilful use of phlebotomy have been suffered to dye for wan_t
of it, upon a dislike of that remedy that physicians for many ages
thought to be grounded upon no less authority than a positive
aphorism of Hippocrates.” Alas for Robert Boyle’s opinion, the
practice which he inculcated, and which has endured till the
present day, is, so far as I know, rapidly becoming extinct; and
all authorities would now agree that the evil foreboded by Hippocrates, and the benefit asserted by Boyle, are equally fallacies.
The fact is that, in science, we can only say that we know nothing about it, that the assertions of Hippocrates, of Boyle, and of
modern authorities are equally without proof, and that We only
know with Celsus that a woman may be bled without causing
abortion. Practitioners must meantime abide in their ignorance,
and use this remedy with as much wisdom as they can bring to
bear on thecase for which its use is suggested.
A main guidance in treatment Hippocrates found in his system.
He might retard or he might hasten the coction of the humours in order to their crasis. He might watch the crisis, and act
accordingly. On all this high-flying wisdoml shall say nothing,
merely dismissing it with the remark, that most of us have some
favourite system, avowed or not, on which we act, and which we
foster to our inward delight, much as Hippocrates did.
The great principle on which Hippocrates conducted his practice, and for the divulging of which he must ever be had in re
(not medicines) ; and this, Do good, and do no harm.
The latter teaching of Hippocrates is often quoted as a good spectful remembrance, is this: Nature or our natures cure diseases ,
maxim in the somewhat altered form,——Be sure that, if you do no
good, you do no harm; and it is certainly, for all and always, a
good rule, that should never fall out of mind. But, unfortunately,
it is one of that numerous class which it is easy to apply to others,
not to ourselves; and he who fails to apply it to himself, is very
likely to be the sanguine enthusiastic, even conscientious practitioner. Such an one, if not rendered extremely cautious by studying the history of his profession, is sure to argue of all he does that
it is doing good, especially if it is old and orthodox practice he
pursues. He, of course, wishes only to do good, and is doing good.
So argued the profuse bleeders and salivators who have only now
become extinct, much to the gain of mankind.
The grand misleading influence is crude theory or hypothesis;
and it is both amusing and instructive to remark that the great
Hippocrates well knew this, elaborately illustrated it, then shut his
introspective eyes and leapt into the very gulf of error against which
he warned others: and in like manner do we act nowadays, full
though our conceited pates are of medical knowledge. Hippocrates
demolished the treatment founded on the hot and cold, dry and
moist, hypothesis, then framed his own system of the four humours,
and diligently treated according to it, forcing diseases to adapt
themselves to it; and his treatment had not the great advantage
of the innocency of homoeopathic cures by infinitesimal doses,
founded on the grossly absurd homoeopathic hypothesis; for he
believed in his theory, and his patients had to suffer severely for it,
like the Greeks for the folly of their kings. One of his notions
was to evacuate the humour, and he used the hellebore and other
violent and certainly not harmless medicines to effect his purpose.
The maxim to do no harm is one for all time, to be inculcated
and re-inculcated, for it is always getting forgotten and lost faster
than it is instilled. Had it been duly attended to, medicine would
have stood immeasurably higher in the public confidence than it
does stand; and quackery and charlatanry would scarcely be able
to find footing, instead of flourishing as they do, a standing and not
undeserved reproach to the ranks of the regular profession. Had
this golden rule of practice been followed; had it been kept in mind not only that judgment is diflicult, but that experiment is
dangerous, as Hippocrates taught,—then Celsus could not have said that the best medicineis to take none; nor Hoffman advised the
patient to flee doctors and drugs if he wished to be safe; nor Radcliffe have said that when young he had fifty remedies for every
disease—when old, one remedy for fifty diseases; nor James Gregory
have said that young men kill their patients, old men let them die;
nor William Hunter have said that to medical theories perhaps
more of the human species have fallen a sacrifice than to the sword
itself or pestilence ; nor Sir Benjamin Brodie have said of John
Hunter, that, by teaching us when not to interfere, he had done
more for the healing art than all the inventors of remedies who had gone before him; nor James Johnston have declared his conviction that, if there was not a single physician, surgeon, apothecary,druggist, nor drug on the face of the earth, there would be less sickness and less mortality than now. These expressions are all, in my opinion, either imperfect or wide of the truth, but they show
how lamentably the teaching of the Father of Medicine has been
and is neglected.
The chief principle of Hippocrates in regard to the cure of disease cannot be said to be a principle of treatment, yet it is above
all treatment, and it is under it that, according to him, treatment
should be conducted. The enunciation of this great principle is
one of the chief glories of "Hippocrates, and will always redound
immensely to his credit. Our natures, says he, cure our diseases ;
or, nature cures disease; or, there is a vis meclicatmlx natwroe. He
did not hold, as Sydenham represents, that nature by herself determines disease, and is of herself sufficient in all things, against all of them; for then his system, or method as Sydenham calls it, and
his diligent treatment according to it, would have been vain. But
he "held that it was not the physician nor his drugs that cure disease ; and here was his great strength and merit. But, like all his
successors, or at least like most, when the Father of Medicine
descends to the subject of his practice, he totters; and this great
and, in many respects, glorious enunciation of Hippocrates demands
some criticism. 
We know too little of the times of Hippocrates to judge of his actual practice. Its results are too much hidden from us. Yet we,
may safely believe he was a great practitioner, for he knew what he
was about probably better than any one else, and he was certainly
a profound thinker, and full of all the knowledge of his time. The
fact, -that his practice has been much admired and followed till
comparatively recent times, is favourable evidence, but of very little
force with him who has paid even a very slight attention to the
history of the profession. The vitality of error and even of mischievous error is quite marvellous. The Hippocratic method or
system and all other systems are now fortunately withered, if not
dead, unless we recognise their revival in the weedy growth of
homoeopathy. The profession is loosed from such useless and injurious trammels, and looks anxiously for some philosopher of the
true inductive character who may on a solid basis establish some
humble and probably only partial method. Meantime we must be
patient, and take care to avoid the hasty adoption of any new
generalization for the guidance of practice. Till we make advance
in scientific manner we must do the very best we can: acquire
knowledge, practise the numerical method, gain experience. Then,
although we may be fairly taunted with our endless variations,
each physician’s practice deserving a title compounded of his
name with ism affixed to it, we may rest in the meantime in satisfactory consciousness that we have striven to increase our knowledge to the utmost, and have used it mixed with all available
wisdom for behoof of our patients.
About the time of the revival of learning in England appeared
the famous Sydenham. He has been called the Father of English
medicine, and I cannot deny him a right to'the title, for I know
not what in the world English medicine is. There is only one kind
of medicine, and of it Hippocrates was the father, and the anatomists and Harvey the revivers and much more. Sydenham was a
worthy sagacious bold man, a distant imitator of Hippocrates, whose
method of observation he has the great merit of restoring. But
he displaced the ambitious and well-designed but premature
medical systems founded on physics or on chemistry, and restored
the old Hippocratic system or theory of disease and of treatment.
He was a retrograde philosopher. As Hippocrates is justly supposed to have been a great and useful practitioner, so is Sydenham.
He is called the chief of English practical physicians. But, for the
true philosopher or for the scientific physician, this enviable distinction is as valuable an indication of real usefulness as a knighthood or a baronetcy; no more. It is a matter of faith or of
reputation, probably having some good foundation, possibly only
some bad one. As we cannot tell even now who are good practi
E tioners a postem'07°7§, how can we judge of Sydenham or of Hippo
crates? Yet we can confidently assert that, as they made the
greatest progress in.their day towards scientific eminence, they were, probably, on that account, the safest guides in practice.
When Broussais vaingloriously says that the real physician is the
one that cures, and that the observation which does not teach the
art of healing is not that of a physician, but is that of a naturalist, he
is at issue with the teaching of Hippocrates and of good sense. Hippocrates and the real physician do not cure; they pretend only, and in a very humble way, to treat disease ; they know that observation,
and experiment have not yet taught us the art of healing, and they
further know that the only kind of observation or the only valuable
kind is that of the naturalist. It is the quack——honest quack it may
be—who founds his system, and builds on it his cures; as Laennec
gently hinted that Broussais did. Every one knows that the doctor
can cure some diseases. He can overcome constipation. He can smother the itch insect. But these are not cures in the sense of
the present discussion, and of them perhaps Hippocrates had as
many as we now have. The great diseases of mankind—the
inflammations, the fevers, the degenerations——Hippocrates did not
pretend to cure; he treated them according to his system. In the
great sense there are no cures, except those miracles which are
appropriately so designated.
Hippocrates says that nature cures’ disease ; and, in his chapter on art, and elsewhere, limits the sphere of medical treatment to diminishing the sufferings of patients, and lessening the violence of
diseases when this IS possible, by the resources of art. He makes
no pretensions to curing diseases.
The declaration of Hippocrates that nature cures disease, cannot,‘ however, be passed over without pointing out two great errors
111 it. One lurks in the word nature, the other in the word disease.
A modern philosopher might, without offence against truth, say that nature cures disease, but he would use the words in a quite different meaning. He would imply, by the word nature,
merely that collocation and arrangement of forces and materials
which produced the desired result; he would use the single word
merely for the sake of brevity. But most moderns use the word
erroneously, as Hippocrates did, to imply some new power or
force evoked by disease, a ms medicatriac, which opportunely comes on the field to combat with, and perchance overcome, the enemy. Now, this is an utterly unjustifiable assumption, an error
against true philosophy, for there is not the slightest knowledge
of such a force as the 72733 medz'catm'a3, nor the slightest reason to
expect its discovery; quite the contrary. In the Hippocratic
system there are many such errors, and they are, comparatively
speaking, easily excusable there. When he solemnly describes
the black bile as a cause of many and ‘various diseases, he is
inditing nonsense, which nobody now believes; although our best
physicians habitually and carelessly speak equal nonsense when
they shake their heads and mutter “liver,” or “bile,” to their
patients. But, for the black bile (and the liver) hypothesis, there
is this to be said, that there are such things as black bile a.nd
liver, whereas we know absolutely nothing of this beneficent
nature, or 7/‘is med*£cato"ia:. Diseases are cured, we know not by
what forces. When Hippocrates raised up nature to take the
place of the priests and their drugs, or of the physicians and their
boasted art, he did a great work for medicine and mankind; but
the work was imperfect. We now dethrone nature, and leave the
seat of honour to be filled up gradually by the knowledge to be expected from the labours of physiologists and pathologists.
The error involved in the word disease nearly resembles the
former; for Hippocrates believed that by it some entirely new
matter or force, or combination of them, was introduced into the
healthy system, to disorder or to destroy it. There may be, in a
peculiar sense (as in zymotic diseases), some truth in this widely
and long established doctrine; but there is no doubt that it is
contrary to the whole tenor of modern knowledge of morbid
processes. We do not now hold that an epileptic is possessed
with devils, which have to be expelled; nor do we hold the
similar View in regard to most other diseases. Hippocrates had
no notion of the subjacent unity of the laws of health and of
disease; and it is, indeed, only now a recognised pursuit to show
the continuity of health and disease on the one hand, and of
disease and health on the other. This pursuit may indeed be
said to be one of the highest aims of modern true medical philosophy, and we must not expect too much even from the Father
of Medicine.
We may, however, observe, to his great credit, that he did not
exhibit any tendency to the belief in specific medicines, which is a
natural consequence of the error just described. Hippocrates
treated disease; he did not pretend to cure it, as do the believers
in specifics. Hippocrates treated disease according to his system;
he did not believe in an additional method of treatment by
specifics, however much he might resort to empirical practice.
Nowadays, when systems of medicine are all in decay, treatment by the best physicians is almost exclusively a more or less rational empiricism; but’ not entirely, for the belief in specifics is still
extensively prevalent, and the venerable Alison has inculcated
the duty of searching for them as one of the great objects of
modern medicine.
Specific medicines were greatly believed in in the time of
Sydenham, who imitated to some extent a botanical classification
in his arrangement of diseases, and supported the doctrine of
a special medicine against each species of disease. About his
time, Jesuits’ bark was introduced into general practice, and it
soon became the model specific, a grand position which it still
retains. Indeed, if we look over the innumerable panegyrics of therapeutical medicine by medical men, we have the cuckoo cry of
quinine, with a11 occasional addition, varied according to the
credulity of the writer. Quinine, however, still survives as not
merely a medicine of_ great value in ague and other diseased
conditions, but as the great specific.
A specific is a medicine of the mode of whose action we are
entirely ignorant; it works by an occult quality. Each specific
encounters its own disease; it enters the body, and, searching,
finds out the spirit of the malady, and, when it finds it, it there
and then smites it, as an ox is smitten in the shambles. “Any
one who objects,” says Sydenham, “to me that a sufficiency of
specific remedies is already known to the world, will, upon a due
considerationof the subject, take the same view with myself. I
am sure of this, since the only medicine that supports his doctrine
is the Peruvian bark. Medicines that specifically answer to the
indications of treatment, and medicines that specifically cure
diseases, are as wide as the poles asunder. In the first case, we
satisfy the curative indications, and drive away the ailment; in
the second, we take no cognisance of the indication or intention at
all, whilst we destroy the disease directly and immediately. For
instance, mercury and sarsaparilla are commonly called specifics
in syphilis. Nevertheless, they are no proper and direct specifics
at all; nor will they be considered as such, until it be shown by
cogent and irrefragable proofs that the one produces its beneficial
effects Without salivation, and the other without diaphoresis. In
this way, many different diseases are cured by their different
appropriate evacuations; but it is the evacuation that performs the cure, the medicine being specific to the evacuation. To the
disease itself, self-sufficiently and directly, they are no more
specific than a lancet is specific to a pleurisy.
Specific medicines, in the restricted sense of the word, are by no means of everyday occurrence. They do not fall to every man’s lot. Nevertheless, I have no doubt but that out of that abundant plenitude of provision for the preservation of all things»
Wherewith nature bourgeons and overflows (and that under the command of the great and most excellent Creator), provision also has
been made for the cure of the more serious diseases which afflict humanity, and that near at hand, and in every country. It is to be lamented, indeed, that the nature of plants is not more
thoroughly understood by us. In my mind, they bear off the
palm from all the rest of the materia medica They offer also the
most reasonable hopes for the discovery~of remedies of the sort in
question. The parts of animals are too like those of the human
body; minerals are too unlike. , That minerals, however, are more
energetic in satisfying indications than either of the two other
Classes of remedies, and that the difference in character is the
reason for their doing so, I freely confess. Still, they are not
Specific remedies in the sense and manner explained above.
The restriction in the definition of specifics here carefully stated
by Sydenham is one which we may neglect, for it is based on his firm but vain belief in his method, which no one now entertains.
Mercury, and even sarsaparilla, have as much right to be included
among specifics as quinine, for We are utterly ignorant of their
mode of action.
by producing evacuations, eliminate the poison. Robert Boyle’s
use of the term is accordingcto a better definition. He does not
hold that these medicines cure diseases “ directly and immediately,”
but that they have ‘f the virtue to cure, by some hidden property,
this or that particular disease, as a pleurisy, an asthma, the colick,
the dropsy, etc.” A specific is “ such a medicine as very often, if
not commonly, does very considerably, and better than ordinary
medicines, relieve the patient, whether by quite curing, or much
lessening, his disease, and which acts privzcipally upon the account
of some property or peculiar virtue; so that if it have any manifest
quality that is friendly, yet the good it does is greater than can
reasonably be ascribed to the degree it has of that manifest
quality, as hot, cold, bitter, sudorifick, etc.
This passage, given above, from Sydenham is purely Hippocratic,
except the utterly groundless, andtherefore meantime unscientific,
doctrine of specifics. Robert Boyle, a friend of Sydenham’s, to whose book I have referred, laboured to show that the docrine of specific remedies is reconcilable to the corpuscular philosophy; but this goes no further in relieving it of untenability an the only theoretical argument of Sydenham in its favour,
We do not believe, as Sydenham did, that they,  peutical extravagance namely, that the existence of such remedies for the graver diseases
is rendered probable by a consideration of the goodness of God.
Similar arguments would justify‘a belief in witchcraft; and, when
we read of the specifics of bygone ages, or even of recent but past
times, we would all nowadays regard them as quite as absurd as
the feats of witchcraftor of ‘ charms; and the many specifics,‘even
of our own day, have only the same claim on our belief as witchcraft has, faith. Robert Boyle’s specifics and Sydenham’s excite
our laughter and derision. Our own specifics do not, only because
they are our own. Boyle and Sydenham would appeal to experience, just as we do now. Facts, they would exclaim; but the
wise man will say, as Laennec did to Broussais, that he cannot
recognise the facts. Cullen has, in banter, expressed this by
saying that in medicine there are as many false facts as false
theories. There are many wonderful survivals of error quite as
striking as the belief in specifics or in quinine. It is a disgrace to
practical medicine that, in the days of the useful but limping
numerical method, we have no unanswerable evidence of the value
of quinine. We have abundant evidence of its frequent apparent
utility, of its frequent failure, of its being in no sense a Syden[hamian specific; and Pereira denies to it the right to any such
pretension. It may be safely asserted that it is not nearly so
well entitled to be ranked as a specific as the humble poultice,
or lying-a-bed, is, in many inflammatory diseases. Considering
the failure of physicians in their searches for specifics, and considering our present limited knowledge of pathology, we cannot
too much deprecate the recommendation of many great men to
continue the pursuit. Few things have retarded medicine more
than this doctrine and the discovery of Jesuits’ bark; were the
only evil produced the diversion of ingenuous youth from work
that is abundantly supplied, and cannot fail to produce good
results. The search for specifics is, from its conditions, likely to
-be not more successful than a boy’s attempt to shoot crows with
his eyes bandaged. Hippocrates is the father of no such therapy. The best moderns do not treat diseases
according to his method or system, or according to any method
whatever; but they join with Hippocrates in doing their best,
with all humility as empirics utterly, or as rational empirics, if
any reason can be found.
It may be truly affirmed that actual practice is not necessarily
modified by the doctrine of specifics, that a disease may be treated
honestly in the same way by a practitioner who believes in specifics,
and by one Who denies that there is any ground for such belief; but this admission does not justify a groundless hypothesis. While no practical advantage is claimed as arising from this hypothesis, it is very certain that, as already pointed out, and in other ways, much practical evil must arise from holding it. Erroneous and groundless doctrines have an inalienable ‘tendency to mislead, and this
is at least as well exemplified in practical medicine as in any other branch of human activity. The believer in specifics has a
constant and strong bias to evade the application to himself of the
rule to do no harm.
If one dared to step forward to defend the doctrine of specifics,
he would assuredly take as the ground of his argument the present, theories of the etiology of some zymotic diseases, implying thus
a limitation of the applicability of such remedies that has, so far
as I know, not been hitherto stated. But, even were a sweet
reasonableness admitted in this argument, it would not" justify, far
less call for, the search for specifics ; for assuredly the logical'and
only proper proceeding in such a case is to find out the specific
In essence of the disease, and its mode of operation, before trying to
Jifind out its cure. One does not set about conquering an enemy without first ascertaining who and where he is, and how he works.
One cannot attempt the solution of a problem which has not even
been stated. Besides, our really justifiable anticipations of benefit
from specifics in the zymotic diseases are restricted to the prevention of the attack, and scarcely reach the process of cure.
In order to do justice to Hippocrates, reference should be made
at length to other matters, and especially to his great and highly
esteemed contributions to medical ethics. But the subject is
remote from those which have occupied this discourse, and cannot
be now dwelt upon.
Hippocrates established on a sure basis medical observation
and research. He made extensive contributions to the natural
history of disease. He separated medicine from priestcraft and
much pseudo-philosophy. He improved the principles of medical
practice. He commenced medical literature. He established
medical ethics.
Had Hippocrates not been truly great, the envious tooth of
corroding time would have long ere this_ laid him low. He still
stands proudly; admired of a whole profession; recognised as
having done more for it than any other man. Let us JO1I1 with
his most enthusiastic disciples, and hail him as divine; and if any
one presumes to cavil at this grand epithet, let hlm be told that
Hippocrates, as a great practical physician, had warm human
sympathies. Has he not himself said, that where there is medical art, there also there is love for men?

Latest revision as of 10:34, 19 April 2018